Abstract: This paper is concerned with the event-based security control problem for a class of discrete-time stochastic systems with multiplicative noises subject to both randomly occurring Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks. An event-triggered mechanism is adopted with hope to reduce the communication burden, where the measurement signal is transmitted only when a certain triggering condition is violated. A novel attack model is proposed to reflect the randomly occurring behaviors of the DoS attacks as well as the deception attacks within a unified framework via two sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences with known conditional probabilities. A new concept of mean-square security domain is put forward to quantify the security degree. We aim to design an output feedback controller such that the closed-loop system achieves the desired security. By using the stochastic analysis techniques, some sufficient conditions are established to guarantee the desired security requirement and the control gain is obtained by solving some linear matrix inequalities with nonlinear constraints. A simulation example is utilized to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed controller design scheme.
Introduction
It has been well recognized that some characteristics of nonlinear systems can be closely approximated by models with multiplicative noises rather than by linearized models [1] . In the past few decades, considerable research efforts have been made on the control issues for stochastic systems with multiplicative noises (also called bilinear systems or systems with state-dependent noises) and a rich body of literature has been available. Up to now, there have been mainly four approaches that shed insightful lights on the control design of stochastic systems with multiplicative noises, namely, the game-theoretic method [2] , the linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach [3] , the Riccati equation approach [4, 5] and the optimization method [6] .
Owing to the ever-increasing popularity of communication networks, more and more control tasks are executed over communication links [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . It should be mentioned that, in the interest of energy saving, the traditional time-based control scheme might be a conservative choice. According to the engineering practice, when the limited resource becomes a concern, the following three points should be taken into account when selecting communication protocols: 1) too frequent data interaction via networks is likely to overspend the depletable bandwidth and thus deteriorate communication quality; 2) it is often the case that only some vitally important measurement data attacks within a unified framework? 2) what kind of methods can be developed to quantify the influences from both the random nature and the interference signals transmitted by adversaries on the security performance?
In this paper, to handle the two identified challenges, an attack model is first proposed to simultaneously describe the randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks via two sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences, and a new concept of mean-square security domain is put forward to quantify the security degree. Then, by using the stochastic analysis techniques, some sufficient conditions are established to guarantee the security requirement of the addressed systems and the desired controller gain is obtained by solving certain linear matrix inequalities with nonlinear constraints. The main contribution of this paper is mainly threefold: 1) A novel attack model is established to account for the randomly occurring behaviors of the DoS attacks and the deception attacks; 2) the event-based mechanism is utilized to reduce the communication burden; and 3) based on the proposed attack model, the controller gain is obtained to ensure that the closed-loop system is secure with respect to the parameter set (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R) where each parameter does have its own engineering interpretation.
Notation The notation used here is fairly standard except where otherwise stated. R n and R n×m denote, respectively, the n dimensional Euclidean space and the set of all n × m real matrices. I denotes the identity matrix of compatible dimensions. The notation X ≥ Y (respectively, X > Y ), where X and Y are symmetric matrices, means that X − Y is positive semi-definite (respectively, positive definite). A T represents the transpose of A. λ max (A) and λ min (A) denote the maximum and minimum eigenvalue of A, respectively. For matrices A ∈ R m×n and B ∈ R p×q , their Kronecker product is a matrix in R mp×nq denoted as A ⊗ B. E{x} stands for the expectation of the stochastic variable x. ||x|| describes the Euclidean norm of a vector x. The shorthand diag{M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M n } denotes a block diagonal matrix with diagonal blocks being the matrices M 1 , ..., M n . In symmetric block matrices, the symbol * is used as an ellipsis for terms induced by symmetry.
Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
In this paper, consider the following discrete-time stochastic system with multiplicative noises in both the system and measurement equations:
where x k ∈ R nx ,ỹ k ∈ R ny and u k ∈ R nu are the state vector, the sensor measurement and the controller input, respectively. A i (i = 0, 1. · · · , r), B and C i (i = 0, 1. · · · , s) are known constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. ω i,k ∈ R (i = 1, 2, · · · , r) and ̟ i,k ∈ R (i = 1, 2, · · · , s) are multiplicative noises with zero means and unity variances, and are mutually uncorrelated in k and i, r and s are known positive integers. It is assumed that the rank of B is n u .
In this paper, an event-triggered communication mechanism is taken into consideration in order to reduce the communication burden. Define the event generator function ψ(·, ·) : R ny × R → R as follows:
where e k :=ỹ t ks −ỹ k withỹ t ks being the transmitted information at the latest event instant and δ 1 being a given positive scalar. The executions are triggered as long as the condition ψ(e k , δ 1 ) > 0 is satisfied. Therefore, the sequence of event triggered instants
is determined iteratively by
Furthermore, it is assumed that the attackers only destroy the transmitted data and have the ability to carry out both the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and the deception attacks with certain success probabilities, in other words, both kinds of attack can be launched in a random way. To reflect such a situation that is of practical significance, a new attack model is proposed as follows: 
Remark 1.
Generally speaking, network attacks can be divided into the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and the deception attacks. For DoS attacks, the adversary prevents the controller from receiving sensor measurements. For deception attacks, the adversary sends false information to controllers. Due to the network-induced phenomena and the application of safety protection devices, there is a nonzero probability for each attack launched via networks to be unsuccessful at a certain time. The model proposed in (3) provides a novel unified framework to account for the phenomena of both randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks.
Remark 2.
Three cases can be observed from (3) as follows: a) the systems suffer from the deception attacks when α t ks = 1 and β t ks = 1; b) the systems are subject to the DoS attacks when α t ks = 0 and the register information on controller cannot be updated in this case; and c) the controller receives the normal sensor measurements when α t ks = 1 and β t ks = 0. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Case a) (with ξ t ks = 0) describes the traditional phenomenon of packet dropouts and Case b) can also reflect the time-delays. Therefore, the proposed attack model covers time delays and packet dropouts as its special cases.
Remark 3.
Due to limited energy, the adversaries could not arbitrarily launch the attacks and, from the defenders' perspective, the cyber-attack could be intermittent and the injected signal is bounded. Furthermore, the injected signal sent by adversaries is a kind of invalid information to achieve the control task and therefore it can be viewed as an energy bounded noise. The main purpose of the present research is to improve the security by enhancing the insensitivity to certain types of bounded and random cyber-attacks.
, the register information (3) can be rewritten as
Remark 4. A schematic structure of the addressed control problem can be shown in Fig. 1 . The adversary can detect the transmitted data from plants and then try to destroy them to attain certain goals. Furthermore, in order to increase the success ratio and enhance the covertness of attacks, the adversary could randomly adopt any type of attacks at each time. On the other hand, it is easy to find from (2) that the time interval (also called inter-event time) between adjacent eventtriggering instants is generally not a constant, which is determined by the event generator function ψ. Therefore, the closed-loop system (5) cannot be regarded as a discrete-time expression with constant sampling interval. Before proceeding further, we introduce the following definitions. Definition 1. For a given positive scalar δ 3 representing the desired security level, the set
is said to be the mean-square security domain of the origin of the closed-loop system (5).
Definition 2. Let R be a positive definite matrix and δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 and δ 4 be given constants. The closed-loop system (5) is said to be secure with respect to
for all k. Remark 5. The five parameters δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 and R do have their own engineering insights. To be specific, δ 1 is the triggering threshold that governs the transmission frequency for the benefit of energy saving, δ 2 is the energy bound for the false signals that the adversary likes to impose on the measurement output from the attacked system, δ 3 is associated with the desired security level (i.e., the upper bound for the dynamics evolution of the attached system in the mean square sense), δ 4 is about the energy of the initial system state and R is the weighting matrix for the initial system state. Obviously, these five parameters play crucial roles for the system security performance evaluation and design.
Our aim in this paper is to design an output feedback controller for system (5) with the eventtriggering communication mechanism and the randomly occurring cyber attacks. In other words, we are going to determine the controller gain K such that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R).
Main Results
In this section, the security is analyzed for the closed-loop system (5) with the event-triggering communication mechanism and the randomly occurring cyber attacks. A sufficient condition is provided to guarantee that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R). Then, the explicit expression of the desired controller gain is proposed in terms of the solution to certain matrix inequalities subject to nonlinear constraints.
Let us start with giving the following lemma that will be used in the proof of our main result in this paper.
Lemma 1. Given constant matrices
Theorem 1. Let the positive scalars δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , the positive definite matrix R and the controller gain K be given. The closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R) if there exist two positive definite matrices P 1 and P 2 , and three positive scalars ε 1 , ε 2 and π satisfying the following inequalities
where
Proof: See the Appendix.
Having obtained the analysis results, we are now in a position to handle the design problem of the controller gain matrix K. First, in terms of Lemma 1 and the inequality
is true if the following holds
In what follows, we introduce a free matrix
where Θ 11 ∈ R nx×p , Θ 12 ∈ R nx×(nx−p) and Θ 22 ∈ R (nx−p)×(nx−p) , B ⊥ stands for an orthogonal basis of the null space for B T . Pre-and post-multiplying the inequality (8) by
It is apparent from (9) that
Finally, in light of
It should be pointed out that the matrix ΘW is invertible if Π 2 ≤ Π 3 < 0. It can be seen that Π 2 < 0 is equivalent to (8) , and therefore Π 2 < 0 is equivalent to (7a) in Theorem 1. Finally, according to the analysis conducted above, the following theorem is easily accessible from Theorem 1 and its proof is therefore omitted.
Theorem 2.
Let the positive scalars δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 and the positive definite matrix R be given. Assume that there exist two positive definite matrices P 1 and P 2 , two matrices Θ andK and three positive scalars ε 1 , ε 2 and π satisfying the matrix inequalities Π 3 < 0, and the condition (7b). In this case, with the controller gain matrix given by
the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R).
Algorithm:
Step 1. Denote a positive scalar τ for linearly searching step size.
Step 2. Let π = 0 and then check the solvability of inequality (7a). If it is solvable, go to next step, else go to Step 6. Step 3. Let π = π + τ , solve the following optimal problem: OP : min π,ρmaxρ max + ε 1 + ε 2 s. t. (7a) and P <ρ max I.
Step 4. If the optimal problem OP is solvable, calculate ρ, γ, λ max (P R ), λ min (P ) and θ 2 . In what follows, obtain Ξ 2 and go to the next step. If it is not solvable, go to Step 6.
Step 5. Check the condition (7b). If
11K is the desired controller gain, the calculation stops. Else go to Step 3.
Step 6. The algorithm is infeasible. Stop.
In the case that the threshold δ 1 = 0, it is not difficult to see that the triggering rules are always fulfilled, that is, the event-based approach reduces to a time-driven one. Consequently, we have the following corollary. Corollary 1. Let the positive scalars δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 and the positive definite matrix R be given. Assume that there exist two positive definite matrices P 1 and P 2 ,, two matrices Θ andK and two positive scalars ε 1 and π satisfying the following inequalities
In this case, with the controller gain matrix given by
11K , the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (0, δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R). Remark 6. In this paper, the event-based security control problem is investigated for a class of discrete-time stochastic systems with multiplicative noises and cyber attacks. By utilizing two sets of Bernoulli distributed white sequences, a novel attack model is proposed to account for the phenomenon of both randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks. Based on such a model, the result established in Theorem 2 contains all the information about the threshold of the event-triggered communication mechanism, the security requirements and the statistical information of cyber attacks. It is worth mentioning that the research methodology developed in this paper is quite general that can be applied to a variety of systems. For example, the obtained results can been easily extended to more complicated cases such as the case where the attacks occur in the channel between controllers and physical systems as well as the channel between sensors and controllers.
Illustrative example
Following [37] , we consider the security control problem for a geared DC motor, which is a component of the MS150 modular servo system. Setting the sampling time T = 0.01s, we obtain the following discretized nominal system matrix and measurement matrix:
In the MS150 modular servo system, the control input u k is a voltage and the measurement output y k is a rotary angle of the extended shaft, which is also called the position of the shaft. The movement of the motor is affected by the stochastic disturbance ω i,k (i = 1). To this end, other parameters are given as
Assume that the attack probabilities areᾱ = 0.90 andβ = 0.25. Moreover, the parameters δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 and R are, respectively, 0.004, 0.10, 0.32, 0.30 and diag{0.95, 0.95}.
By using the Matlab software (with the YALMIP 3.0 [38] ) where the solver is selected as 'solvesdp', a set of feasible solutions of Theorem 2 is obtained as follows: Fig. 2 , the control performance is degraded by attacks.
The event-triggered time and the successful time of attacks are shown in Fig. 4 , from which we can easily find that the number of event-triggered communication is quite small and the communication burden is effectively reduced. In Table 1 and Table 2 , we further examine the effect on the security level from the increased attack probability of DoS attacks (or deception attacks) and we can conclude that the security performance deteriorates as the attack probability increases. 
Conclusion
In this paper, the event-based security control problem has been discussed for a class of discretetime stochastic systems with multiplicative noises. The plant under consideration is subject to randomly occurring DoS attacks and randomly occurring deception attacks. First, a novel attack model has been provided to describe such two attacks within a unified framework. Then, an eventbased communication mechanism has been utilized to reduce the communication burden. Furthermore, the output feedback controller gain matrix has been obtained by solving a linear matrix inequality with nonlinear constraints. Finally, a simulation example has been exploited to show the effectiveness of the event-triggered security control scheme proposed in this paper.
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For any scalar γ > 1, it follows from the above inequality that
Selecting γ = ρ ρ−π and one has from (16) that
which implies
Finally, it can be concluded from (7b) that the closed-loop system (5) is secure with respect to (δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , R), which completes the proof.
